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LEGALLY SPEAKING:
Reasonable Doubt
It is important for police to understand the meaning of the phrase “beyond a reasonable 
doubt”. This legal standard is much more onerous than the legal standard for most police 
actions requiring reasonable grounds for belief, such as arrests or searches. So what may 
justify an arrest and submission of a Report to Crown Counsel, will is some cases not meet 
the proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard required for a criminal conviction. Thus the 
reason for a Crown charge approval standard of a substantial likelihood of conviction (or reasonable 
prospect of conviction). In short, just because an officer meets the reasonable grounds standard does not 
necessarily mean a charge and conviction will follow. “The phrase ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’, is composed 
of words which are commonly used in everyday speech,” said Justice Cory for the majority of the Supreme 
Court of Canada in R. v. Lifchus, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 320. “Yet, these words have a specific meaning in the 
legal context. This special meaning of the words “reasonable doubt” may not correspond precisely to the 
meaning ordinarily attributed to them. In criminal proceedings, where the liberty of the subject is at stake, it 
is of fundamental importance that jurors fully understand the nature of the burden of proof that the law 
requires them to apply.” To better understand the meaning of this standard, the Canadian Judicial Council 
drafted the following model jury instruction for explaining “proof beyond a reasonable doubt”. By reading this, 
it may also assist the police in understanding this onerous standard:
[1] The principle of “proof beyond a reasonable doubt” is an essential part of the presumption of innocence. 
[2] A reasonable doubt is not a far-fetched or frivolous doubt. It is not a doubt based on sympathy or prejudice. It 
is a doubt based on reason and common sense. It is a doubt that arises at the end of the case based not only 
on what the evidence tells you but also on what that evidence does not tell you.  
[3] It is not enough for you to believe that [the accused] is probably or likely guilty. In those circumstances, you 
must find him/her not guilty, because the Crown would have failed to satisfy you of his/her guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Proof of probable or likely guilt is not proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
[4] You should also remember, however, that it is nearly impossible to prove anything with absolute certainty. The 
Crown is not required to do so. Absolute certainty is a standard of proof that does not exist in law. 
[5] If, at the end of the case, and after assessing all of the evidence, you are not sure that [the accused] committed 
the (an) offence, you must find him/her not guilty.
[6] If, at the end of the case, based on all the evidence, you are sure that [the accused] committed the (an) offence, 
you should find [the accused] guilty.
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POLICE LEADERSHIP 
APRIL 10-13, 2011
Mark your calendars!!! The 
British Columbia Association 
of Chiefs of Police, the 
Ministry of Public Safety and 
Solicitor General, and the 
Justice Institute of British 
Columbia, Police Academy are 
hosting the Police Leadership 2011 Conference in 
Vancouver, British Columbia. This is Canada's largest 
police leadership conference and will provide an 
opportunity for delegates to discuss leadership topics 
presented by world-renowned speakers. 
www.policeleadershipconference.com
SUPPORT THE BADGE:
RELATIONAL SURVIVAL 
FOR POLICE FAMILIES
“The true weight of the badge is not overcome by 
muscle, not found in the gym, not measured on a 
scale. This weight requires a strength and 
conditioning for which few officers are trained. The 
badge is not just pinned on a chest, it is pinned on a 
lifestyle.” - Police Officer
www.supportthebadge.ca
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ON-DUTY DEATHS DOWN
On-duty peace officer 
deaths in Canada fell by 
two last year, the lowest 
total in 55 years. This is 
the third consecutive year 
that on-duty deaths have 
declined. In 2008, two 
peace officers lost their lives on the job. This low 
number has not been seen since 1952 and 1953, 
when in those years only two on-duty peace 
officers deaths were recorded, as reported by 
the Officer Down Memorial Page. 
Motor vehicles, not guns, continue to pose the 
greatest risk to officers over the last 10 years. 
Since 1999, 32 officers have lost their lives in 
circumstances involving vehicles, including 
automobile and motorcycle accidents (21), 
vehicular assault (4), and being struck by a 
vehicle (7). These deaths account for 44% of all 
on-duty deaths, which is more than twice the 
next leading cause of gunfire (15) in the same 10 
year period. On average, seven officers lost their 
lives each year during the last decade, while 2002 
had the most deaths at 12. 
2008 Roll of Honour
C.O. Joseph McKeown
Correctional Services Branch, AB
End of Watch: July 22, 2008
Cause of Death: Heart Attack
Constable Eric Lavoie
Laval Police Department, QC
End of Watch: September 8, 2008
Cause of Death: Automobile Accident
Source: The Officer Down Memorial Page, www.odmp.org
They are our heroes. We shall not forget them.
“Police officers are the front line of society’s defence 
against crime.  ... [A]n attack on a police officer is an 
attack on society itself.  Parliament has deemed it 
necessary to clearly denounce 
the murder of a police officer.” 
Manitoba Court of Queen’s Bench Justice Menzies in R. v. Sand, 2003 MBQB 43, upholding the constitutionality of 
s.234(1)(a) of the Criminal Code in  the murder of Royal Canadian Mounted Police Constable Dennis Strongquill.
www.10-8.ca
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U.S. On-Duty Deaths Drop
During 2008, the U.S. lost 132 peace 
officers, down 54 from 2007. The 
top cause of death was motor 
vehicle accidents (46) — including 
autos and motor cycles — followed 
by gunfire (36), vehicular assaults 
(12), and being struck by a vehicle (11). The state of Texas lost 
the most officers (14), followed by California (11), Florida (8), 
Pennsylvania (7), the U.S. Government (6), Ohio (6) and the 
states of Louisiana, Maryland, 
Missouri, New York, and Ohio 
each with five. The average 
age of deceased officers was 
39 years and the average tour 
of duty was 10 years and 11 
months. Men accounted for 
89% of officer deaths while 
women made up the remaining 
11%.
Canadian Peace Officer On-Duty Deaths (by year)
Cause 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 Total
Aircraft accident 2 2 1 2 1 8
Assault 1 1
Auto accident 1 1 2 1 3 6 2 1 1 18
Drowned 1 1 2
Duty related illness 1 1
Fall 1 1
Gunfire 3 3 5 1 1 2 15
Heart attack 1 1 2 1 1 6
Motorcycle accident 1 2 3
Natural disaster 1 1
Stabbed 1 1
Struck by vehicle 3 2 2 7
Training accident 1 1 2
Vehicular assault 1 1 1 1 4
Total 2 4 6 11 7 6 12 7 9 6 72
2008 U.S. Peace Officer On-Duty Deaths
Cause Total
9/11 related illness 1
Accidental 1
Aircraft accident 4
Assault 1
Auto accident 38
Bomb 2
Drowned 1
Duty Related Illness 2
Electrocuted 1
Exposure to Toxins 1
Gunfire 36
Gunfire (accidental) 2
Heart attack 5
Motorcycle accident 8
Stabbed 2
Struck by vehicle 11
Train Accident 1
Vehicle pursuit 3
Vehicular assault 12
Total 132Source: The Officer Down Memorial Page, www.odmp.org (accessed January 3, 2009)
US On-Duty Deaths by Year
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Deaths 163 162 153 188 132
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LEGALLY SPEAKING:
Wiretap Authorization Legal Standard 
“The trial judge has to consider whether 
there is sufficient reliable information on the 
basis of which the authorizing judge could 
have granted the authorization.
The authorizing judge must be satisfied that there are 
reasonable and probable grounds to believe that an offence 
has been, is being, or is about to be committed, and that the 
authorization sought will afford evidence of that offence. 
However, the trial judge does not stand in the shoes of the 
authorizing judge when conducting the review. The question 
for the trial judge is whether there was any basis on which 
the authorizing judge could have granted the authorization. 
The trial judge should only set aside an authorization if 
satisfied on all the material presented, and on considering 
“the totality of the circumstances”, that there was no basis on 
which the authorization could be sustained.  The trial judge’s 
function is to examine the supporting affidavit as a whole, and 
not to subject it to a ‘microscopic analysis’”. - British 
Columbia Court of Appeal Chief Justice Finch, R.  v. Lee, 
2008 BCCA 240, paras. 12-14, references omitted.
LATER STATEMENT NOT 
TAINTED: CONNECTION TO 
EARLIER STATEMENT WEAK  
R. v. Woods, 2008 ONCA 713
The accused was arrested at 6:16 pm on 
assault and weapons charges after his 
wife was shot in the kitchen of their 
home. In the police cruiser, he made a 
number of statements to police. He said the shooting 
was an unintended accident. He did not expect the gun 
to go off and did not think he could shoot or think 
straight. He said he was a gunsmith and was cleaning 
his gun when his wife “started bugging” him. He also 
claimed that he had previously been of assistance to 
police. In response to specific questions from a police 
officer about the ownership and type of gun, the 
accused admitted it was his gun and said that it was a 
“.38 police special”.  
The accused was transported to the police station, 
arriving at about 6:49 pm. He was taken to an 
interview room with working videotape equipment and 
his entire contact with police in the interview room was 
recorded.  He was promptly advised that he was now 
charged with murder and was cautioned about his 
rights, but was not told he should not be influenced by 
anything he had said earlier to other officers when he 
was in the cruiser.  After attempts to contact his 
counsel of choice were unsuccessful, he spoke to duty 
counsel by telephone for about 14 minutes. The police 
later located his lawyer of choice and he spoke to her 
for about five minutes and later met for about 30 
minutes with another lawyer. In total, he consulted with 
three different lawyers for over 50 minutes in a four-
hour period, during which time the police made no 
effort to question him except about the victim’s next-
of-kin.  
At 12:54 a.m. a detective interviewed the accused for 
two hours and twenty minutes and took a statement 
from him.  The accused willingly talked about the 
shooting, giving various contradictory accounts of his 
actions and those of his wife, whether he knew the gun 
was loaded or whether he had loaded the gun, how he 
reacted or even knew about a telephone call his wife 
made to a male friend, the amount of alcohol consumed 
by his wife on the evening of the shooting, his reactions 
to the telephone call and his wife’s drinking, his 
knowledge of guns, the mechanics of the .38 calibre gun 
in question, and his repeated statement that the 
shooting was an accident.  He explained that he had 
pointed the gun at the kitchen door with the intention 
of scaring, not shooting, his wife.
At trial in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice the 
judge excluded the accused’s statements to police 
taken in the cruiser after his arrest because the Crown 
failed to prove voluntariness and reliability.  The 
experienced police officer specifically asked the 
accused about the gun in contravention of the his 
s.10(b) Charter rights—he wanted to consult with his 
lawyer.  The judge was also concerned about the 
reliability and trustworthiness of the accused’s 
statements in the cruiser because the police officer 
typed his notes with his right hand at the same time 
that he was driving the cruiser. In the judge’s view, the 
admission of the cruiser statements would tend to 
render the trial unfair.   
As for the accused’s videotaped statement at the 
police station, it was ruled admissible. The judge 
recognized that the detective was not involved in the 
accused’s statements in the cruiser and “there is 
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nothing in the confessions rule 
which prohibits the police from 
questioning the accused in the 
absence of counsel after the 
accused has contacted or retained 
counsel.”  The manner or duration 
of questioning was not oppressive 
and the accused willingly 
volunteered information, even though he knew he did 
not have to and was told by counsel not to talk to the 
police. The questions by police were simple and 
straightforward and appropriate to the accused’s 
limited cognitive abilities. There also were no 
attempts to use aggressive techniques or non-existing 
or fabricated evidence to elicit answers. And he was 
not asked any questions about the statements he gave 
in the cruiser.  He was convicted by a jury of second 
degree murder. 
The accused appealed to the Ontario Court of Appeal 
arguing, among other grounds, that the trial judge 
erred in admitting the videotaped statement he gave 
at the police station on the basis that the statement 
was tainted by the circumstances of his earlier 
statements in the police cruiser. Justice Lang, writing 
the Court’s opinion, rejected the accused’s assertion:
[I]n our view, the police station statement was not 
tainted by the earlier cruiser statement.  It was 
taken more than six hours after the [accused] was 
advised of the new charges of murder.  The 
statement, which was extensive, was taken in a 
different location by a different officer after the 
[accused] had been given his right to counsel, had 
consulted three different lawyers and had 
acknowledged that he understood he was not 
required to answer the officer’s questions.  
The officer who took the cruiser statement was 
not present during the station interview and, 
indeed, had left the station some two hours 
earlier. During the course of the station interview, 
the [accused] willingly volunteered information, 
sometimes without prompting.  The interviewing 
officer did not refer to nor rely on the cruiser 
statement in his questioning of the [accused], nor 
was there anything in the cruiser statement that 
would have compelled the [accused] to want to give 
a further explanation to the police.  In both 
interviews, the [accused] consistently maintained 
that the shooting was an accident.  Accordingly, 
there was no nexus between the cruiser and station 
statements.  In my view, the 
station statement was a “fresh 
start”… 
While it would undoubtedly have 
been ideal, with the benefit of 
hindsight, if [the detective] had 
also cautioned the [accused] not 
to be influenced by anything he 
had said earlier to other officers, 
such a caution was not required in the 
circumstances of this case where the combination 
of the temporal, causal and contextual connections 
between the two statements was so weak.  [paras. 
9-11].
The accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
BY THE BOOK:
s.11.2(5) Ontario’s SPCA Act: 
Protecting Law Enforcement Animals
On November 27, 2008, Ontario’s Bill 50, 
the Provincial Animal Welfare Act, , 
received Royal Assent and amends the 
Ontario Society for the Prevention of 
Cruelty to Animals Act. In it, a new section 
makes it an offence to harm a law 
enforcement animal.
Prohibitions re distress, harm to an animal
Harming law enforcement animals
11.2 (5)  No person shall harm or cause harm to a dog, 
horse or other animal that works with peace officers in the 
execution of their duties, whether or not the animal is 
working at the time of the harm.
 
Offences
18.1 (1) Every person is guilty of an offence who … (c) 
contravenes subsection [11.2(5)]… 
.........
(3) Every individual who commits an offence under clause 
(1) …(c) is liable on conviction to a fine of not more than 
$60,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than 
two years, or to both.
“The is nothing in the confessions 
rule which prohibits the police from 
questioning the accused in the 
absence of counsel after the 
accused has contacted or retained 
counsel.” 
www.10-8.ca8
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Nations. In terms of percentages, municipal policing 
accounted for about 65% of officers, provincial 
policing 25%, federal policing 7% and others (such 
as the RCMP HQ and Training Academy) 4%. 
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In 2007, the total expenditures on policing was $10,543,530,000
Canada’s Largest Municipal Police Services 2008
Service Officers % Female
Actual Authorized
Toronto, ON 5,535 5,510 17%
Montreal, QC 4,481 4,538 29%
Peel Regional, ON 1,700 1,829 16%
Calgary, AB 1,620 1,670 14%
Edmonton, AB 1,345 1,375 18%
York Regional, ON 1,318 1,364 17%
Winnipeg, MN 1,311 1,318 15%
Ottawa, ON 1,273 1,301 22%
Vancouver, BC 1,351 1,235 22%
Durham Regional, ON 827 831 19%Source: Statistics Canada, 2008, 
Police Resources in Canada, 
Catalogue No:85-225-X, December 2008
RCMP ‘HQ’ & 
Training Academy 
1,776
Royal Newfoundland Constabulary
3,693
Quebec Provincial Police
5,277
Ontario Provincial Police
5,718
CANADA:
By the Numbers
POLICING NUMBERS ACROSS 
THE NATION
According to a 2008 report 
recently released by Statistics 
Canada there were 65,283 police 
officers across Canada last year, 
up 1,149 (1.8%) from the previous year. Ontario had 
the most officers (24,945) while the Yukon had the 
least (117) (see map below for all provincial/
territorial numbers). With 
a population of 33,223,840, 
Canada’s average cop per 
pop ratio was 196 police 
officers per 100,000 
residents.
The report included all 
levels of policing: federal, 
provincial / territorial, 
municipal, and First 
www.10-8.ca
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Gender
There were 12,207 female officers accounting for 
18.7% overall. Quebec had the greatest percentage 
of female officers (21.8%) while Nunavut had the 
lowest (10.1%). Female officers 
accounted for 7.7% of senior 
officers, 13.3% of non-
commissioned officers, and 
21.2% of constables. 
Canada’s Largest Municipal RCMP Detachments 2008
Service Officers % Female
Actual Authorized
Surrey, BC 546 588 24%
Burnaby, BC 272 265 31%
Richmond, BC 206 206 23%
Kelowna, BC 141 141 25%
Coquitlam, BC 130 140 29%
Langley Township, BC 111 129 29%
Prince George, BC 118 128 23%
Red Deer, AB 111 125 25%
Kamloops, BC 109 120 26%
Nanaimo, BC 118 118 25%
Area % Female
QC 21.8%
BC 21.3%
NWT 18.0%
NF 17.8%
SK 17.7%
ON 17.5%
AB 16.4%
NB 15.3%
NS 14.9%
MB 14.8%
YK 13.7%
PEI 12.6%
NU 10.1%
RCMP
The RCMP had the largest presence in 
British Columbia with 5,742 officers, 
followed by Alberta (2,417), Ontario 
(1,335) and Saskatchewan (1,176).
Police Officers by Gender-Canada 2008
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MORE FACTS, FIGURES, & 
FOOTNOTES
• 101,525 - number of private security personnel 
in Canada in 2006. This includes private security 
guards (91,325) and private investigators (10,200).
• 24% - percentage of private security personnel 
who were women. This is up from 20% in 1996 and 
23% in 2001. 
• $31,029 - average income in 2005 dollars for 
private security guards.
• $49,762 - average income in 2005 dollars for 
private investigators.
• $73,582 - average income in 2005 dollars for 
police officers.
• 37% - percentage of private security guards in 
2006 that had completed at least a college 
certification.
• 55% - percentage of private security 
investigators in 2006 that had completed at least 
a college certification.
• 75% - percentage of police officers in 2006 that 
had completed at least a college certification.
• 321 - rate of private security personnel per 
100,000 Canadian population in 2006.
• 192 - rate of police officers per 100,000 
Canadian population in 2006.
• 20% - proportion of private security personnel 
belonging to a visible minority in 2006. This is up 
from 10% in 1996 In 2006, all occupations in 
Canada were 15% visible minority, while police 
officers were only 6% visible minority. 
• 5% - proportion of private security personnel who 
were Aboriginal in 2006. This is up from 3% in 
1996. In 2006, all occupations in Canada were  3% 
Aboriginal, while police officers were 4% 
Aboriginal. 
Source: Statistics Canada, 2008, Private Security and Public 
Policing, 85-002-X, Vol. 28, no. 10, December 2008.
CMA Police Officers & Crime Rates 
CMA Officers - 2008 Crime Rate - 2007
Toronto, ON 9,585 4,461 (26)
Montreal, QC 6,997 5,958 (16)
Vancouver, BC 3,410 9,136 (7)
Calgary, AB 1,711 6,202 (13)
Edmonton, AB 1,667 9,572 (5)
Winnipeg, MN 1,364 9,644 (4)
Ottawa, ON 1,350 5,457 (21)
Hamilton, ON 1,081 5,511 (20)
Quebec, QC 1,019 4,524 (24)
Kitchener, ON 743 4,906 (22)
St. Catharines-Niagara, ON 727 5,711 (18)
London, ON 693 7,296 (12)
Halifax, NS 679 7,954 (10)
Windsor, ON 603 6,138 (14)
Victoria, BC 511 9,335 (6)
Saskatoon, SK 449 11,560 (2)
Gatineau, QC 431 5,718 (17)
Regina, SK 386 11,827 (1)
St. John’s, NL 303 7,325 (11)
Thunder Bay, ON 266 8,819 (8)
Greater Sudbury, ON 249 5,627 (19)
Abbotsford, BC 242 10,341 (3)
Trois-Rivieres, QC 227 4,478 (25)
Sherbrooke, QC 227 4,831 (23)
Kingston, ON 218 5,970 (15)
Saint John, NB 208 8,292 (9)
Saguenay, QC 179 4,398 (27)
CMA=Census Metropolitan Area
Source: Statistics Canada, 2008, Police Resources in Canada, 
Catalogue No:85-225-X, December 2008
www.10-8.ca
11
Volume 9 Issue 1
January/February 2009
  RCMP FAST FACTS
The Royal Canadian Mounted Police is 
Canada’s largest police organization. As 
of April 15, 2008 the force’s on-
strength establishment was 26,292, 
including 17,618 police officers, 60 
special constables, 3,244 civilian 
members and 5,370 public servants. 
As well, more than 75,000 volunteers 
assist the RCMP which is divided into four regions 
with 15 divisions. (source: www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca)
BC
5,742 AB
2,417
QC
1,015ON
1,335
SK
1,176
MN
957
NF
515
YK
117
NU
119NWT
178
NS
989
PEI
141
NB
897
RCMP ‘HQ’ & Training Academy 1,776
Source: Statistics Canada, 2008, 
Police Resources in Canada, 
Catalogue No:85-225-X
December 2008
Region Division Area
North West D Manitoba
F Saskatchewan
G Northwest Territories
V Nunavut Territory
K Alberta
Depot Regina, Saskatchewan
Pacific E British Columbia
M Yukon Territory Region Division Area
Central A National Capital Region
O Ontario
C Quebec
Atlantic B Newfoundland
H Nova Scotia
J New Brunswick
L Prince Edward Island
Numbers under each 
provincial abbreviation 
indicate number of 
RCMP officers
RCMP On-Strength Establishment
as of April 15, 2008
Rank # of Positions
Commissioner 1
Officers 685
Staff Sergeants 826
Sergeants 1,779
Corporals 3,209
Constables 11,118
Total 17,618
Source: www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca, accessed December 24, 2008
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30 DAY CONDITIONAL SENTENCE 
HEARING TRIGGERED ON ARREST 
R. v. Kabosos, 2008 ONCA 711
Five weeks after the accused was given a 
12 month conditional sentence and a two 
year probation order for break and enter 
x 3 and failure to comply with probation, 
he was arrested and charged with break and enter, 
possessing break-in instruments, and possessing stolen 
property stemming from a new incident. About a month 
later, the accused’s conditional sentence supervisor 
prepared documents for the conditional sentence 
breach. A warrant for the accused’s arrest was issued 
a week later and was subsequently executed about 
three weeks after issue.  
Ninety-six days after the accused’s arrest for the 
new offences (or 56 days after the warrant was 
issued, and 33 days after the warrant was executed) 
the hearing related to the alleged breach of condition 
took place. However, under s.742.6(3) of the Criminal 
Code “The hearing of an allegation of a breach of 
condition shall be commenced within thirty days, or as 
soon thereafter as is practicable, after (a) the 
offender’s arrest…”. The Ontario Superior Court 
judge hearing the case found the 33 day delay (from 
when the warrant was executed until the 
commencement of the hearing) was close to the 
statutory 30 day period and was as soon as is 
practicable. 
The accused then challenged the judge’s ruling to the 
Ontario Court of Appeal arguing, in part, that the 
issuance of the warrant should trigger the 30 day time 
period even though it was not an “arrest”. In his view, 
the underlying policy of s.742.6 of the Criminal Code
is to address alleged breaches of a conditional 
sentence urgently. As well, he submitted the 
conditional sentence is potentially suspended when the 
arrest warrant is issued and if its execution, rather 
than its issuance, triggers the 30 day period there 
would be no incentive for police to execute the 
warrant expeditiously. 
Justice MacPherson, delivering the unanimous 
judgment for the Court, first noted there were three 
possible triggers for the statutory 30 day time period:
1) the accused’s arrest on the new offence which led 
to the conditional sentence breach;
2) the issuance of the arrest warrant for the 
conditional breach;
3) the execution of the conditional breach arrest 
warrant. 
Justice MacPherson concluded that the triggering 
event was the accused’s arrest on the breach warrant, 
not the day the warrant was issued. First, the 
legislation is clear that the 30 day period is triggered 
by the “offender’s arrest”:  
[T]he wording of s. 742.6(3) is clear.  The 30 day 
period leading up to the commencement of the 
breach hearing is triggered by “the offender’s 
arrest”.   The arrest of the offender on the new 
offence is an arrest.   So is the execution of the 
warrant which compels the offender to appear to 
answer the charge of breach of condition.  
However, the issuance of the warrant is not an 
arrest; it compels nothing of the offender until he 
receives it.
………
This leaves a final question: does “the offender’s 
arrest” as stated in s. 742.6(3)(a) of the Criminal 
Code refer to the [accused’s] arrest for the new 
offence, or to his arrest … for a breach of his 
conditional sentence?
In my view, the answer is obvious; the relevant date 
is when the warrant is executed.  Section 742.6 is 
entitled Procedure on Breach of Condition and 
contains the subheading Warrant or arrest – 
suspension of running of conditional sentence.  
Further, the entire provision deals with a specific 
offence: the breach of condition of a sentence.  In 
addition, there will be some cases (not this one) 
where the offender commits no new offence; all he 
does is breach a condition of the sentence he is 
already serving.  Accordingly, both the wording and 
the logic of s. 742.6 compel the conclusion that “the 
offender’s arrest” in s. 742.6(3)(a) refers to his 
arrest for breach of condition, not for the new 
offence.  [references omitted, paras. 15-18]
Justice MacPherson also rejected the accused’s delay 
argument. Section s. 742.6 (14) of the Criminal Code
allows a court to deem unreasonable delay in the 
execution of an arrest warrant as time served under 
the conditional sentence order. “This provision, 
coupled with the policy underlying the provision and 
judicial statements… combine to ensure that the police 
and court administrators will not delay steps they 
must take in an alleged breach of condition scenario,” 
he said. 
Complete case available at .ontariocourts.on.ca
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DNA DATABANK ORDER DOES 
NOT REQUIRE PROOF OF 
FORENSIC VALUE
R. v. Boskoyous, 2008 ABCA 359 
The accused pled guilty in Alberta 
Provincial Court to trafficking in cocaine, 
a secondary designated offence under 
ss.487.051(3) and 487.04 of the Criminal 
Code for the purposes of a DNA databank order. The 
sentencing judge therefore had the discretion to 
make a DNA databank order, but did not order it. The 
judge was not satisfied the accused tended to leave 
DNA at crime scenes, nor was a DNA order 
appropriate based on the accused’s past criminal 
behaviour because many of his crimes would not even 
be secondary offences. The 
Crown appealed the sentencing 
judge’s decision not to impose 
the DNA data bank order to the 
Alberta Court of Appeal. 
The unanimous Appeal Court 
allowed the appeal. In delivering 
the Court’s judgment from the 
bench, Justice Watson noted 
that the sentencing judge 
appeared to have assumed that 
DNA testing was inappropriate 
if he was not persuaded that 
there was a present forensic 
purpose for the testing process, which is specific to 
the individual offender. The sentencing judge also 
appeared to dismiss the accused’s criminal record as 
relevant in determining whether DNA testing would be 
appropriate. Justice Watson found the sentencing 
judge erred in both respects:
As to the first error, Parliament has defined 
eligibility for DNA databank orders by categories 
of offences, not by a requirement of proof of 
present and individual forensic value. Parliament’s 
intention to create and maintain a large comparative 
databank of persons who commit offences within 
those categories is reflected in the language it has 
used. This serves the administration of justice and 
the interests of justice broadly as well as by 
individual. Parliament’s intentions could include the 
acquisition of statistical information; category 
offenders can be said to be volunteers for such 
research. Parliament did not stipulate a 
requirement that, before an order is made, the 
offender must be proven to likely be implicated in 
past or future crimes by DNA traces that have 
evidential significance. DNA residue may be a 
potential source of evidence in almost any crime 
situation. DNA evidence can be exculpatory also. It 
is not for courts, absent unconstitutionality, to 
judicially narrow the categories chosen by 
Parliament. 
As to the second error, the trial judge’s approach 
to the [accused’s] criminal record of 35 prior 
convictions, including some for violent conduct, is 
similar to the first error. He seems to say that in 
order for a criminal record to be relevant, it must 
also include prior convictions for offences 
designated for inclusion in the DNA databank. In 
mandating consideration of the criminal record 
under s. 487.051(3), Parliament did not state any 
such limitation. The criminal record 
of an offender can be relevant for a 
variety of reasons, one of which may 
be its indication that the person is 
defiant to the laws of society 
generally, in which case his future 
conduct is of concern. Further, the 
statistical objectives of the 
databank may also be served by such 
further information about the source 
donors. Further still, the “impact” of 
the taking of the DNA samples upon 
the privacy and security of the 
person of the specific offender may 
be better appreciated in light of his 
experience with the administration 
of justice. Once again, it will be recalled that DNA 
evidence may be exculpatory. It will also be recalled 
that when an offender’s DNA profile is already 
included in the DNA databank and has not been 
removed under law, further sampling may not be 
necessary: s. 487.071 of the Code. [references 
omitted, paras. 4-5]
The reasons of the sentencing judge in this case did 
not support a decision to exempt the accused from a 
DNA databank order. The Crown’s appeal was 
successful and, in the best interests of justice, a DNA 
databank order was made by the Alberta Court of 
Appeal. 
Complete case available at albertacourts.ab.ca
Note-able Quote
“Laws too gentle are seldom obeyed; too severe, 
seldom executed.” - Benjamin Franklin
“Parliament has defined eligibility 
for DNA databank orders by 
categories of offences, not by a 
requirement of proof of present and 
individual forensic value ... 
Parliament did not stipulate a 
requirement that, before an order is 
made, the offender must be proven 
to likely be implicated in past or 
future crimes by DNA traces that 
have evidential significance.”
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VEHICLE THEFTS:
CANADA 2007
According to a Statistics Canada report released in 
December 2008, there were 146,142 vehicles stolen in 
Canada in 2007. Other highlights include:
• 400 - average number of vehicles stolen in Canada 
each day.
• 54% - percentage of stolen motor vehicles that 
were cars, followed by trucks, vans, or SUVs at 
35%, motorcycles at 4%, and other types of 
vehicles accounted for the remaining 8%.
• 2,500 - the number of motor vehicles that were 
stolen during the commission of another, more 
serious offence.
• 11% - percentage of vehicles thefts where an 
accused was identified by police.
• 40 - the number of people who die each year as a 
result of motor vehicle thefts.
• 15 -18 year olds - represent the highest rate of 
accused motor vehicle thieves. As one ages, the 
rate gradually tapers off. 
Canada’s Top 10 Stolen Vehicles - 2008
Year Make Model
2000 Honda Civic SiR 2-door
1999 Honda Civic SiR 2-door
2004 Subaru Imprezza WRX Sti 4-door AWD
1995 Dodge/Plymouth Grand Caravan/Voyager
1995 Dodge/Plymouth Caravan/Voyager
2002 Acura RSX Type S 2-door
2001 Audi TT Quatro Roadster
1995 Acura Integra 2-door
1996 Dodge/Plymouth Neon 2-door
1996 Dodge/Plymouth Neon 4-door
Source: Insurance Bureau of Canada, www.Ibc.ca, (December 17, 
2008) accessed December 23, 2008
Canada’s Least 10 Stolen Vehicles - 2008
Year Make Model
2003 Cadillac Deville 4-door
2002 Lincoln Continental 4-door
2001 Lincoln Town Car 4-door
2007 Chevrolet Impala 4-door
2001 Toyota Avalon 4-door
1999 Toyota Tacoma 2 WD
2005 Buick Terraza EXT
2003 Buick Regal 4-door
2002 Toyota Highlander 4-door 2WD
2000 Ford/Mercury Taurus/Sable Wagon
Source: Insurance Bureau of Canada, www.Ibc.ca, (December 17, 
2008) accessed December 23, 2008
Canada Motor Vehicle Thefts & Rates - 2007
Region Thefts Rate Recovered
Quebec 36,216 470 33.6%
Ontario 34,737 271 68.5%
British Columbia 27,112 619 81.6%
Alberta 23,248 669 75.5%
Manitoba 14,671 1,236 81.4%
Saskatchewan 5,526 554 81.4%
Nova Scotia 1,875 201 69.2%
New Brunswick 1,343 179 61.6%
Newfoundland 606 120 77.6%
Northwest Territories 300 704 90.3%
Nunavut 207 665 94.6%
Prince Edward Island 167 121 77.1%
Yukon 134 432 82.3%
Rates are per 100,000 population
Source: Statistics Canada, 2008, Motor Vehicle Theft in Canada, 2007, 
Catalogue No:85-002-X, Vol. 28, no. 10, December 2008
• Quebec - the province having the most motor 
vehicle thefts (36,216). It also had the lowest 
recovery percentage (33.6%).
• Manitoba - the province having the highest motor 
vehicle theft rate per 100,000 population (1,236).
• Nunavut - the province or territory having the 
highest percentage of stolen motor vehicles 
recovered (94.6%)
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• Public areas - the place where most stolen 
vehicles were taken in 2007. Parking lots 
accounted for  32% of stolen vehicles, followed 
by the street or other open area (24%), 
commercial establishments (eg. shopping 
centres) (9%), and public institutions (eg. 
schools) (2%). About 33% were taken from 
private property while about 1% were stolen 
from a car dealership or rental company.
• 443 - Canada’s rate of motor vehicle theft 
per 100,000 population.
• 63.6% - Canada’s overall stolen vehicle 
recovery rate.
• -9% - percentage by which motor vehicle 
theft declined from 2006 to 2007.
• -25.2% - the percent decline in Canada’s 
motor vehicle theft rate from 1997 to 2007.
• $1,000,000,000.00 - the estimated annual 
financial cost of motor vehicle theft to 
consumers, police, insurance companies, and 
governments.
Source: Statistics Canada, 2008, Motor Vehicle Theft in 
Canada, 2007, Catalogue No:85-002-X, Vol. 28, no. 10, 
December 2008
CMA Motor Vehicle Thefts & Rates 2007
CMA Total Thefts Theft Rate Recovered
Winnipeg, MN 12,548 1,714 81.6%
Abbotsford, BC 1,693 1,001 74.1%
Edmonton, AB 9,120 832 70.0%
Regina, SK 1,495 735 75.3%
Calgary, AB 7,318 639 86.0%
Vancouver, BC 14,411 630 84.1%
Saskatoon, SK 1,541 616 80.8%
Montreal, QC 22,403 601 30.9%
London, ON 2,331 489 73.0%
Hamilton, ON 3,400 481 82.1%
Trois-Rivieres, QC 533 363 44.0%
Victoria, BC 1,204 355 83.0%
Sherbrooke, QC 524 350 43.3%
Gatineau, QC 860 294 53.4%
Toronto, ON 15,392 279 67.2%
Halifax, NS 1,035 269 66.8%
Saguenay, QC 384 265 34.9%
Ottawa, ON 2,353 264 62.5%
St. Catherines-Niagara, ON 1.100 254 72.7%
Kitchener, ON 1,186 239 76.7%
Thunder Bay, ON 286 233 82.1%
Windsor, ON 769 231 76.1%
Greater Sudbury, ON 367 226 82.6%
Quebec, QC 1,585 216 55.1%
St. John’s, NF 383 210 78.5%
Kingston. ON 269 176 53.6%
Saint John, NB 170 168 71.0%
CMA=Census Metropolitan Area
Source: Statistics Canada, 2008, Motor Vehicle Theft in Canada, 
2007, Catalogue No:85-002-X, Vol. 28, no. 10, December 2008
• 44 - the average number of vehicles stolen in 
British Columbia each day.
• 70 - the average number of vehicles broken 
into in British Columbia each day.
• Ford F-series trucks - most stolen vehicle in 
British Columbia (as of October 16, 2008).
Source: www.icbc.com, accessed December 28, 2008.
B.C.’s Top 5 Stolen Vehicles - 2007
Make Model Model Years
Honda Civic 93,95,97,98,00
Chrysler 
(Dodge/Plymouth)
Caravan/Voyager 92-95
Honda Accord 90-94
Ford F-series 97,03-06
Jeep Cherokee 92-96
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NO CONSUME CONDITION OK 
DESPITE NO CONNECTION TO 
OFFENCE
R. v. Hardenstine, 2008 BCCA 474
The accused pled guilty to possessing 
ammunition while prohibited arising from 
an incident where police attended his 
residence looking for his girlfriend. She 
had been wanted on a number of outstanding warrants.  
The accused was sentenced to an additional 30 days 
imprisonment in addition to time served and was placed 
on two years probation, which included conditions that 
he abstain absolutely from the consumption of any 
alcohol or non-prescription drugs and was not to enter 
any premises such as a bar, pub or liquor store, where 
the primary commodity sold was alcohol.
The accused appealed his probation order to the 
British Columbia Court of Appeal, seeking to vary it by 
deleting provisions requiring him to refrain from 
consuming alcohol and from entering certain premises 
where alcohol was sold. He argued that neither the 
circumstances of the offence nor his background 
provided any basis for concluding that the probation 
conditions would assist in his rehabilitation or protect 
society. Although his criminal record was appalling, 
with over 40 criminal convictions, it did not disclose 
any pattern of alcohol abuse (other than a single over 
80mg% conviction). The impugned probation conditions, 
he suggested, should not have been imposed in the 
absence of solid evidence of alcohol abuse.
Justice Groberman, delivering the judgment of the 
Court, disagreed:
Section 732.1(3)(c) of the Criminal Code specifically 
authorizes a condition such as [no alcohol 
consumption] to be imposed where appropriate.  
[Refraining from entering premises serving alcohol] 
appears to have been imposed pursuant to s. 
732.1(3)(h), which permits a court to prescribe, as 
a condition of probation, that the accused “comply 
with such other reasonable conditions as the court 
considers desirable … for protecting society and for 
facilitating the offender’s successful reintegration 
into the community.”
Probation conditions are generally put in place to aid 
in the rehabilitation of the accused, and to protect 
society during the period of probation. As counsel 
has pointed out, they are not designed to be punitive 
in nature; i.e. they are not put in place for purposes 
of denunciation, retribution, or general 
deterrence. … 
In order for conditions of probation to be 
reasonable, they must be linked to the 
circumstances of the offender.   Often, the 
circumstances of the offence will be critical to 
establishing the link, but a court is not limited to a 
consideration of the circumstances of the offence 
in determining what conditions of probation are 
appropriate.  The court may consider, as well, other 
aspects of the offender’s situation.   [references 
omitted, paras. 6-8]
Although there was no clear connection between the 
impugned probation conditions (alcohol consumption or 
places where alcohol was sold) and his offence 
(possession of ammunition while prohibited) and any 
connection with his past criminal record was weak, the 
conditions were nonetheless reasonable. In holding 
there was a sufficient basis for concluding that the 
impugned probation conditions were desirable tools for 
enhancing the prospects of the accused’s 
rehabilitation and for protecting society during the 
period of probation, Justice Groberman stated:
While the case at bar does not represent the 
strongest case for imposing the conditions with 
respect to alcohol that were imposed, there were 
factors in the accused’s situation that made the 
conditions reasonable.  This is particularly so when 
the judge was entitled to take judicial notice of the 
fact that alcohol consumption generally reduces 
inhibitions, and that places where alcohol is 
consumed are not infrequently also associated with 
drug trafficking and with weapons.  In this case, 
1)  the accused had recently overcome an addiction 
to drugs, and wished to avoid further trouble;
2)  he had some, albeit limited, past criminal 
behavior associated with alcohol consumption;
3)  he had a history of violent crime, and the 
offence for which he was being sentenced involved 
ammunition for firearms
4)   the additional custodial sentence being imposed 
was very short, such that it provided little time for 
the accused to be further rehabilitated prior to his 
release into the community
[para. 16]
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
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CORROBORATION OF TIP’s 
CRIMINAL ASPECT NOT 
REQUIRED FOR WARRANT
R. v. Caissey, 2008 SCC 65
A police officer received information 
from a first time informant that he/she 
had been in a certain apartment within 
the preceding 72 hours and had observed 
a large quantity of marijuana being held by the accused 
for resale. The informant identified the accused, the 
address of the apartment, and also indicated that 
while the accused had a roommate (Kelsey Coenen) it 
was only the accused who was involved in selling drugs. 
The informant said that the accused had been selling 
drugs for one year. The informant provided details 
relating to the interior of the apartment and the 
accused’s motor vehicle, and indicated that no children 
lived at the address.
The investigating officer confirmed from independent 
sources that the accused lived with Kelsey Coenen at 
the address provided, and that the accused drove a 
vehicle that matched the informant’s description. The 
officer prepared an information to obtain a search 
warrant in which he set out the information he 
received and disclosed the extent and result of his 
investigation. While the officer verified the 
information provided, the police had not corroborated 
certain details, such as the fact that marijuana could 
be found in the apartment.
The search warrant was issued and executed. In a 
locked bedroom within the residence the police located 
and seized 180 grams of marijuana, drug paraphernalia, 
and documents in the accused’s name. He was charged 
with possession of marijuana for the purpose of 
trafficking. 
At trial in Alberta Provincial Court the accused 
challenged the validity of the search warrant. He 
argued, among other grounds, that the information 
provided was insufficient to support the issuance of 
the search warrant. The trial judge ruled the 
information established those details that had been 
confirmed, which provided a sufficient basis to issue 
the search warrant. She concluded that it was 
reasonable to believe that there was marijuana in the 
apartment and the accused was convicted of simple 
possession. 
The accused then appealed his conviction to the 
Alberta Court of Appeal submitting, in part, that the 
trial judge erred in failing to apply the proper legal 
test when determining the validity of the search 
warrant. He contended that confirmation of 
information received from a confidential informant 
must include confirmation of criminal activity. In his 
view, information provided by a first-time informant 
can only constitute sufficient grounds for the issuance 
of a search warrant if there is independent 
confirmation of the allegations relating to the crime. 
Consequently, he argued that the search warrant 
should not have been issued because the police failed 
to independently confirm the first-time informant’s 
information that the accused had marijuana in the 
apartment. The accused submitted that some 
independent confirmation relating to the criminal 
aspect of the tip was required in a case where the 
police were relying on a tip from an informant of 
unknown reliability in order to negate the possibility 
that the informant was offering false information.
The Crown, on the other hand, submitted that the trial 
judge applied the correct test in reviewing the 
issuance of the search warrant and that the 
jurisprudence did not require confirmation of the 
criminal aspect of the information. Rather, the court 
must take into account the totality of the 
circumstances to determine whether the search 
warrant could have issued on the evidence. The Crown 
further submitted that the evidence was sufficient to 
meet that test.
In a 2:1 majority, the Alberta Court of Appeal upheld 
the issuance of the search warrant. When the validity 
of a search warrant is challenged, it may be necessary 
to inquire into the source and quality of the 
information provided to the police at the time of the 
search in order to establish that there were 
reasonable and probable grounds for the search. Mere 
conclusory statements by an informant are insufficient 
to constitute reasonable and probable belief. Details 
relating to the confidential informant, the information 
received or the background investigation must be 
provided. 
An informant’s "tip" must contain sufficient detail to 
ensure it is based on more than mere rumour or gossip, 
whether the informer discloses his or her source or 
means of knowledge and whether there are any indicia 
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of his or her reliability, such as the supplying of 
reliable information in the past or confirmation of part 
of his or her story by police surveillance. The 
reliability of the tip is to be assessed by recourse to 
"the totality of the circumstances". There is no 
formulaic test as to what this entails. Rather, the 
court must look to a variety of factors including the 
degree of detail of the "tip"; the informer’s source of 
knowledge; and indicia of the informer’s reliability such 
as past performance or confirmation from other 
investigative sources. When the police rely on an 
anonymous tip or on an untried informant the quality of 
the information and corroborative evidence may have 
to be such as to compensate for the inability to assess 
the credibility of the source.
 
In holding the warrant valid in this case, the majority 
stated:
Reliability of an informant may be established by 
past performance as an informant or by 
confirmation from other investigative sources of 
part, or all, of the information provided by the 
informant…. 
The issue on review is whether there was some 
evidence that might reasonably be believed to 
support the issuance of the warrant, not whether 
there is some guarantee that the informant is 
telling the truth when he makes the allegation of 
criminal activity. Information of a crime itself being 
committed does not have to be confirmed… 
We agree with the Crown’s submission that the trial 
judge applied the correct test and made no error in 
concluding that the search warrant could have been 
issued on the evidence provided. The trial judge 
considered whether the information provided was 
"sufficiently detailed to preclude the possibility 
that it’s based on mere rumour." Regarding the 
aspect of reliability of the informant, the trial 
judge relied on the evidence confirming some 
aspects of the information provided. In this 
respect, she stated: "We are looking for this 
confirmation because if the tipster is proven 
correct about some details it might be safe to rely 
on other information provided." The trial judge 
examined the factors set out in Garofoli and 
correctly referred to the standard of review. She 
acknowledged that she could not overturn the 
search warrant simply because she might not have 
granted it. The trial judge concluded that the 
authorizing judge could have issued the search 
warrant based on the record before him, as 
amplified on review, as there was some information 
that might reasonably be believed. She based this 
finding on the information that the informant had 
recently been in the [accused’s] apartment and had 
personally witnessed the drugs in the [accused’s] 
possession.
The trial judge committed no error. With reference 
to the three factors set out in Debot, the 
information provided by the informant was detailed 
and compelling, and was based on his/her personal 
knowledge that had been recently obtained while in 
the [accused’s] apartment. Although the informant 
had not previously provided confidential information 
to the police, he/she was known to the police 
officer, and the police independently confirmed a 
number of details, including the identity of the 
[accused] and his residential address, that no 
children lived in the home, the name of his 
roommate, and the description of his vehicle. 
Confirmation of this information tended to 
substantiate the reliability of the informant’s 
information, and was sufficient in the context of 
the other factors to meet the reasonable 
probability test. While the police did not obtain any 
confirmation of the fact that the [accused] 
possessed marijuana, such confirmation is not 
necessary in the circumstances of this case. The 
trial judge correctly stated and applied the law. 
[paras. 22-25]
A Different View
Justice Martin, in dissent, concluded that the 
information provided was insufficient to support the 
search warrant. He said:
Here, the information was sufficiently detailed to 
guard against rumour and innocent coincidence. 
However, the informant’s credibility was untested 
and remained unknown at the time the search 
warrant issued. In terms of corroboration, the 
police investigator was only able to corroborate 
non-criminal particulars, such as the [accused’s] 
address, the identity of his roommate, the make and 
colour of his motor vehicle. This was innocuous 
information available to anyone in the neighbourhood 
and those familiar with the [accused] (or his 
roommate). Confirmation of these non-criminal 
particulars shed no light on the reliability of the 
accusation that the [accused] was in possession of 
marijuana or selling drugs. It did not, in any material 
way enhance the credibility of this first-time 
informant.
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I accept that in assessing the reliability of the 
information provided, the totality of circumstances 
must be examined and short comings in one of the 
three factors may be compensated by strengths in 
another. But here, there was no evidence at all to 
establish the third factor, informant’s credibility or 
meaningful corroboration. This is more than a mere 
short coming.
To issue this search warrant, the justice of the 
peace relied exclusively on uncorroborated 
allegations of criminal conduct provided by a first-
time informant. The information relied on to obtain 
the search warrant did not offer any meaningful 
assurance that the informant was credible and 
therefore the allegations of criminal conduct were 
likely true. In my opinion, this was inadequate legal 
justification to authorize the search of a home.
………
In my opinion, when a first-time informant whose 
credibility has not been previously (or otherwise) 
established, evidence of his or her credibility is 
required before allegations of criminal conduct are 
relied upon….
In my opinion, confirmation of non-criminal 
particulars offered by a first-time informer does 
not necessarily alleviate the concern that the 
information about criminal conduct may be false. 
Only corroboration of some criminal particular 
offers that assurance. A malicious informant may 
falsely offer very detailed information by claiming 
it was based on personal observation. Therefore, 
neither a detailed account nor corroboration of an 
innocent particular of that account offers the 
needed assurance that the informant is credible and 
the information likely true. [paras. 31-38]
The accused then appealed to the Supreme Court of 
Canada. In a brief oral judgment Chief Justice 
McLachlin dismissed the appeal on behalf of the seven 
member court. She agreed with the legal test adopted 
by majority of the Alberta Court of Appeal and 
rejected the view that only corroboration of some 
criminal particular of the offence was needed to 
justify the issuance of the search warrant. 
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.gc.ca
Editor’s note: The facts of this case and the lower 
judgment of the Alberta Court of Appeal were taken from 
2007 ABCA 380.
NEW SUPREME COURT JUSTICE 
APPOINTED
On December 22, 2008 The Right 
Honourable Beverley McLachlin, Chief 
Justice of Canada, welcomed the 
appointment by Prime Minister 
Stephen Harper of Mr. Justice 
Thomas Cromwell to the Supreme 
Court of Canada. “Justice Cromwell is 
a judge of the highest ability, 
integrity and intellect”, said Chief Justice McLachlin.  
“In addition to his vast experience on the Bench, he 
also brings a profound understanding of the role and 
the challenges of the Supreme Court. I look forward to 
the contribution of this distinguished jurist to the 
work of the Court.” 
Justice Cromwell, who sat as a judge of the Nova 
Scotia Court of Appeal, was sworn in as a justice of the 
Supreme Court of Canada on December 23, 2008. 
The Supreme Court for 2009 now consists of the 
following nine members:
• The Right Honourable Beverley McLachlin, P.C. Chief 
Justice of Canada 
• The Honourable Mr. Justice William Ian Corneil Binnie 
• The Honourable Mr. Justice Louis LeBel 
• The Honourable Madam Justice Marie Deschamps 
• The Honourable Mr. Justice Morris J. Fish 
• The Honourable Madam Justice Rosalie Silberman Abella 
• The Honourable Madam Justice Louise Charron 
• The Honourable Mr. Justice Marshall Rothstein 
• The Honourable Mr. Justice Thomas Albert Cromwell 
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
Reasonable Grounds-Breath Demand
“The Criminal Code provides that where a 
police officer believes on reasonable and 
probable grounds that a person has 
committed an offence pursuant to s. 253 of 
the Code, the police officer may demand a 
breathalyzer. The existence of reasonable and probable 
grounds entails both an objective and a subjective component.  
That is, s. 254(3) of the Code requires that the police officer 
subjectively have an honest belief that the suspect has 
committed the offence and objectively there must exist 
reasonable grounds for this belief:’ - Supreme Court of Canada 
Justice Sopinka in R. v. Bernshaw, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 254  
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INFORMER PRIVILEGE & THE
INNOCENCE AT STAKE 
EXCEPTION
R. v. Zidarov, 2008 NLCA 65
Police received a tip from a regular and 
confidential informant that the accused 
was selling marijuana from his car, that it 
was parked in a mall parking lot, and that 
the informant had recently seen marijuana in the 
vehicle. Acting on the tip, police went to the mall and 
found the accused seated in his vehicle with a 
significant quantity of marijuana in bags in the back 
seat (street value of between $2,200 to $3,200). In 
addition to the drugs, police seized $1,565 in cash and 
three cell phones from the vehicle.
At trial in Newfoundland Provincial Court the accused 
testified he was sitting in his car awaiting the return 
of an acquaintance who he had driven to the mall. The 
acquaintance and owed the accused $2,000, which was 
to be repaid that evening. The accused also said he did 
not know the marihuana was in the back seat and said 
the acquaintance had placed the packages containing 
the marijuana in the vehicle. The trial judge refused to 
order the disclosure of the confidential informant on 
the basis of the “innocence at stake” exception, so the 
accused called the acquaintance as a witness. The 
acquaintance denied having any contact with the 
accused on the day of his arrest. The trial judge 
refused to allow a question about whether the 
acquaintance had been in contact with the police on 
that date, on the basis the answer might identify the 
informer. The trial judge found the accused guilty of 
possessing marihuana for the purpose of trafficking.
The accused appealed his conviction to the 
Newfoundland Court of Appeal arguing, in part, that 
the trial judge erred in finding the accused could not 
establish his innocence was at stake so as to warrant 
an order that the identity of a confidential informant 
be revealed. He submitted that the acquaintance had 
lied to the court if he and the informer were the same 
person. That is, the acquaintance denied having contact 
with the accused on the day of his arrest but the 
informer reported having had contact. This false 
testimony, it was suggested, would likely raise a 
reasonable doubt about whether the marijuana 
belonged to the accused and warrant reconsideration 
of whether there should be an exception to the 
informer privilege rule in these circumstances.
Justice Barry, writing the opinion of the Newfoundland 
Court of Appeal first examined the law surrounding the 
innocence at stake exception and informer privilege. In 
R. v. Leipert, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 281, the Supreme Court of
Canada explained the onus is on an accused to raise the 
innocence at stake exception to informer privilege and 
show some “basis on the evidence for concluding that 
disclosure of the informer’s identity is necessary to 
demonstrate the innocence of the accused”. Mere 
speculation that the information might help the 
accused is not enough. If an accused is successful in 
meeting the onus and showing that disclosure is 
necessary to prove innocence, the “court should only 
reveal as much information as is essential to allow 
proof of innocence. Before disclosing the information 
to the accused, the Crown should be given the option of 
staying the proceedings. If the Crown chooses to 
proceed, disclosure of the information essential to 
establish innocence may be provided to the accused.” 
An example of a circumstance falling within the 
innocence at stake exception includes a situation where 
the informer is a material witness to the alleged crime.
In this case, Justice Barry concluded that the trial 
judge erred in not reconsidering the innocence at stake 
exception to informer privilege following the 
acquaintance’s testimony that he had not been in 
contact with the accused. Here, the identity of the 
informer went to a material element of the offence—
whether the accused had possession of the drugs or 
whether they were only in the possession the 
acquaintance. If the informant and the acquaintance 
turn out to be the same person, his credibility may be 
so damaged as to raise a reasonable doubt as to the 
accused’s guilt and put his innocence at stake if the 
informant was not identified.
The accused’s appeal was allowed and a new trial was 
ordered.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
Note-able Quote
“Common sense in an uncommon degree is what the 
world calls wisdom.” - Samuel Taylor Coleridge 
www.10-8.ca
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ARREST OF ‘TAKE-AWAY’ 
OBJECTIVELY JUSTIFIED
R. v. Doak, 2008 BCSC 1359
A police investigator, believing there was 
a marihuana grow operation in one of two 
outbuildings, applied for a warrant to 
search the outbuildings and a residence on 
property owned by the accused and his wife. The 
justice issued the warrant for the two outbuildings, 
but refused to allow a search of the residence. While 
waiting for the warrant, police took up surveillance of
the property. The investigator instructed the officers 
doing surveillance to arrest anyone leaving the 
property (“take-aways”).
The accused, seen near the residence, was observed to 
enter a pickup truck and leave the property. The 
vehicle was stopped by an officer and the driver, who
was recognized as the accused, was arrested for 
producing marihuana. He was searched and $10,985 
was found in his pocket along with ½ pound of marihuana 
bud in a shopping bag stuffed behind the driver’s seat 
in his vehicle. The investigator, with this additional 
information, re-applied for the warrant to search the 
outbuildings and the residence. It was granted and, 
upon executing it, police discovered a marihuana grow 
operation in one of the outbuildings along with a hydro 
bypass. The police seized evidence from the other 
outbuilding and from the main residence. He was 
charged with production of marihuana, possession for 
the purpose of trafficking, and theft of hydro. 
At trial in British Columbia Supreme Court the accused 
challenged, in part, the validity of the search warrant 
relating to the residence, asserting it breached s.8 of 
the Charter. He argued that the arresting officer did 
not have the necessary grounds to arrest him. Thus, 
the arrest was unlawful and arbitrary, and breached 
s.9. The search of his person and the vehicle that 
followed was not lawful as incident to arrest and 
therefore was unreasonable under s.8 and the 
information obtained from it must be excised from the 
ITO. The warrant to search the house was therefore 
not justified and the evidence should be excluded 
under s.24(2).
The Crown, on the other hand, conceded that the police 
lacked reasonable grounds to arrest every person, 
whether of known or unknown identity, seen leaving the
property, even though they had reasonable grounds to 
believe a marihuana grow operation was located in one 
or both of the outbuildings. The Crown submitted, 
however, that the arresting officer was not simply 
acting on the investigator’s direction, but 
independently had reasonable grounds to arrest the 
accused. He had been identified as the prime suspect 
in connection with the suspected marihuana grow 
operation and was seen coming from the property. The 
blanket instruction given by the investigator to arrest 
anyone seen leaving the property did not nullify the 
grounds possessed by the arresting officer. The 
search was therefore lawful as an incident to arrest 
and none of the information in the ITO required 
excision.
The Arrest
The accused’s arrest would be lawful if the arresting 
officer had the requisite grounds to arrest him for the 
offence of production of a controlled substance. Under 
s. 495(1)(a) of the Criminal Code a peace officer may 
arrest, without warrant, a person “who, on reasonable 
grounds, he believes has committed or is about to 
commit an indictable offence”. The test for reasonable 
grounds imports both a subjective and an objective 
component. The arresting officer must subjectively 
have reasonable grounds for the arrest and those 
grounds must be objectively justifiable. However, the 
police need not demonstrate anything more than 
reasonable grounds and are not required to establish a 
prima facie case for conviction before making the 
arrest.
In this case, “the mere fact that a person was seen 
leaving the Property would not be sufficient to connect 
that person with the crime that [the investigator] 
believed was being committed on the Property,” said 
Justice Joyce. He continued:
[I]t is my view that the police in this case lacked 
reasonable and probable grounds to arrest everyone 
found on or found leaving the Property, regardless 
of who they were. [The accused’s] arrest was 
therefore not lawful if [the arresting officer] 
simply relied on [the investigator’s] general 
instruction. There is no suggestion that [the 
investigator] was aware that [the accused] was seen 
leaving the Property and that he therefore had 
reasonable and probable grounds to arrest [the 
accused] and gave specific instructions to [the 
arresting officer] to arrest [the accused]. [para. 42]
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However, despite the investigator lacking grounds for 
arrest, the arresting officer himself had reasonable 
grounds and did not simply arrest any person seen 
leaving the property in accordance with the general 
instruction given:
When [the arresting officer’s] evidence with 
respect to the grounds for arrest…is considered as 
a whole, I am satisfied that he in fact used his own
independent judgment to determine that he had 
reasonable grounds to arrest [the accused] and did 
not simply rely on the general instruction given by 
[the investigator]. Clearly, he relied on the 
information gathered by [the investigator] during 
his surveillance, which was shared with [the 
arresting officer] at the police briefing, to conclude, 
in his mind, that a marijuana grow operation was 
being conducted on the Property and he was entitled 
to rely on that information.
But it is important that, in deciding to arrest 
arrested [the accused], [the arresting officer] also 
relied on the fact that he was able to identify 
arrested [the accused], who was the owner of the 
Property and prime suspect, as the person who had 
just left the Property. As [the defence lawyer] 
himself suggested to [the arresting officer], based 
on the information [the arresting officer] had 
received from [the investigating officer], he 
arrested [the accused] “as soon as [he was] able to 
identify that it was [the accused].”
………
[The arresting officer] honestly believed that [the 
accused] was participating in a criminal offence 
based on the information provided to him at the 
briefing and his identification of him as the man who 
had just left the Property. Subjectively, he had 
grounds to arrest. It is also my opinion that the 
grounds are objectively reasonable. 
In my view, it is the identification of [the accused] 
by [the arresting officer] as a person who has just 
left the Property that is critical. … These facts, 
together with the information that [the arresting 
officer] had acquired from [the investigator], gave 
[the arresting officer] the objective grounds to 
make the arrest. … 
The present case is not one in which the police 
arrested first and then determined whether the 
person arrested was connected to the offence under 
investigation.
I am satisfied there were sufficient circumstances 
to objectively connect [the accused] to the offence 
under investigation to justify his arrest. He was  one 
of the registered owners of property on which the 
police had reasonable grounds to believe a marijuana 
grow operation was located. I note, contrary to what 
was understood to be the case during the course of 
submissions, according to the ITO [the accused] had 
not, to this point, been identified as the subscriber 
to the Hydro account that the police believed 
showed elevated usage. Even so, in addition to the 
fact that he was an owner of the Property, [the 
accused] was the registered owner of a vehicle (the 
red Ford Excursion) that was seen leaving the 
Property six days earlier. More importantly, just 
prior to his arrest, he was seen leaving the Property 
in a vehicle that had been parked on the Property in 
the vicinity of the shed/shop for over three hours. 
In my view, it was reasonable to infer in these 
circumstances that he had a present connection to 
the Property that went beyond mere ownership and, 
in the absence of any contrary information, that he 
was in control of the Property.
Prior to the issuance of the first search warrant the 
investigation provided reasonable grounds to believe 
that a grow operation was being conducted on the 
Property in one of the two outbuildings situated near 
to the residence. … The additional evidence obtained 
… was, in my opinion, sufficient to raise the 
connection between [the accused] and the offence 
being investigated from a mere suspicion to a 
credibly based probability. [paras. 44-50]
Since there were reasonable grounds to arrest the 
accused, it was lawful and the police were entitled to 
search him and the vehicle he was driving incidental to 
his arrest. As a result, the evidence found as a result 
of those searches was properly included in the second 
ITO.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
Reasonable Grounds-Arrest
“In summary then, the Criminal Code requires 
that an arresting officer must subjectively 
have reasonable and probable grounds on 
which to base the arrest. Those grounds 
must, in addition, be justifiable from an 
objective point of view.  That is to say, a reasonable person 
placed in the position of the officer must be able to conclude 
that there were indeed reasonable and probable grounds for 
the arrest.” - Supreme Court of Canada Justice Cory in R. v. 
Storrey, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 241  
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SEXUAL ASSAULT: BY THE
NUMBERS
In a recent Statistics Canada Canadian Centre for 
Justice Statistics profile released in December, 2008 
entitled “Sexual Assault in Canada 2004 and 2007”, 
victimization and offender data for sexual assaults in 
Canada were analyzed. Highlights include:
• 24,200 - approximate number of sexual assaults 
reported to Canadian police in 2007. 
• One in Ten - number of sexual assaults reported 
to police out of the number of assaults reported on 
a victimization survey. 
• 94% - percentage of sexual touching incidents to go 
unreported to police.
• 78% - percentage of sexual attacks to go 
unreported to police.
• Not Important Enough - the most commonly 
stated reason why sexual assault victims did not 
report an incident to police (58%), followed by the 
incident was dealt with in another way (54%), it was 
a personal matter (47%), and the victims did not 
want to get involved with police (41%). Victims could 
report more than one response, therefore the sum 
of percentages could exceed 100%.
• 73 per 100,000 - the Canadian rate of police 
reported sexual offences.
• 63% - percentage of reported sexual offences 
cleared by police. Those cleared by charge 
accounted for 42%, while 21% were cleared 
otherwise, such as when the complainant requested 
charges not be laid, when the accused had died, had 
diplomatic immunity, or had been diverted, or when 
the police otherwise exercised discretion in not 
charging.
Provincial Rates of Police Reported 
Sexual Offences, 2007
Province Rate per 100,000
Saskatchewan 138
Manitoba 113
Newfoundland 89
New Brunswick 87
Nova Scotia 82
British Columbia 79
Alberta 70
Quebec 69
Ontario 61
Prince Edward Island 58
2007 Police Reported Sexual Offence Clearance Rates
Offence Cleared 
by charge
Cleared 
otherwise
Not 
cleared
Lvl 1 
   - sexual assault
42% 21% 37%
Lvl 2 
   - sexual assault with weapon
45% 9% 47%
Lvl 3 
   - aggravated sexual assault
68% 4% 28%
Other sexual offences 37% 26% 37%
Source: Statistics Canada, 2008, Sexual Assault in Canada, 2004 and 2007, 
Catalogue No:85F0033M,, no. 19, December 2008
• 49% - adult court conviction (finding of guilt) rate 
for sexual offence cases (2006/2007). 
• 63% - youth court conviction rate for sexual 
offence cases (2006/2007). 
• 54% - proportion of convicted adult sex offenders 
sentenced to custody. Only 12% of convicted youth 
sex offenders were sentenced to custody. Sixty six 
percent of convicted adult sex offenders were 
sentenced to probation while 78% of youth sex 
offenders were sentenced to probation (2006/
2007).
• Female - gender most often victim of sexual 
assault.
• Male - gender most often accused of sexual 
offences. Those charged with sexual offences were 
97% male. 
• Not a stranger - where relationships are 
determined, 82% of the time the accused is known 
to the victim. The accused was a stranger in only 
18% of sexual assault incidents.
www.10-8.ca28
Volume 9 Issue 1
January/February 2009
